Con "notte di Taranto" ci si riferisce ad un attacco aereo avvenuto nella notte tra l'11 ed il 12 novembre 1940 contro il porto di Taranto, durante la seconda guerra mondiale. In quella data la flotta navale della Regia Marina italiana, dislocata nel porto di Taranto, riportò gravi danni in seguito all'attacco portato dagli aerei imbarcati della Royal Navy britannica.
Premessa
La base navale di Taranto, così come tutte le basi navali italiane, era bene attrezzata per la riparazione delle unità danneggiate, grazie soprattutto alla disponibilità di grandi bacini di carenaggio, ed alla presenza nel suo arsenale di tutti i pezzi di ricambio per i macchinari e le armi. Tuttavia si riscontravano gravi carenze per tutto ciò che riguardava la protezione contraerea e la protezione antisiluramento delle navi in porto: le batterie contraeree erano del tutto insufficienti sia come numero che come calibro, e a questo si aggiungeva la scarsa protezione notturna determinata dall'assenza del radar, per cui la rilevazione di eventuali aerei ostili in avvicinamento era affidata a vecchi proiettori di scarsa portata, guidati da aerofoni risalenti alla prima guerra mondiale.
Per quanto riguarda la protezione antisiluro, questa era affidata alle reti anti-siluro, anch'esse poco numerose a causa della scarsità di materie prime che affliggeva l'industria italiana: si producevano infatti 3 600 metri di rete al mese, da distribuire a tutte le basi italiane, e dei 12 800 metri commissionati per la protezione delle navi ormeggiate nel Mar Grande solo poco più della metà era giunta a destinazione, e molti non erano ancora stati distesi.
Scenario
Nell'agosto del 1940 erano entrate in servizio due nuove importanti unità della Regia Marina: le navi da battaglia Vittorio Veneto e Littorio. Con un dislocamento di 41 300 t e un armamento principale di nove cannoni da 381/50 mm, erano fra le più potenti navi da guerra dell'epoca.
Due mesi più tardi le truppe italiane attaccarono la Grecia partendo dall'Albania, occupata l'anno precedente, costringendo la Gran Bretagna ad intervenire al fianco della Grecia, sia per evitare che gli italiani finissero per controllare il mar Egeo, mettendo così in pericolo la sicurezza di Alessandria d'Egitto, sia per scoraggiare la Turchia dall'entrare nel conflitto come alleata dell'Asse. Questo comportò un aumento notevole del numero di convogli marittimi britannici in partenza dall'Egitto, già impegnati per rifornire l'isola di Malta, roccaforte britannica nel Canale di Sicilia, vicino alla quale transitavano i convogli marittimi italiani diretti in Libia. La posizione di Taranto, che insieme ai porti di Tripoli e Tobruch, consentiva alla Regia Marina di controllare il Mediterraneo centrale, destava la preoccupazione dell'ammiragliato britannico, in quanto le navi italiane, che vi facevano base, avrebbero potuto facilmente raggiungere e distruggere i convogli marittimi britannici in navigazione.
L'operazione Judgement
La Royal Navy, nella persona del Comandante in Capo della Mediterranean Fleet, ammiraglio Andrew Cunningham, decise allora di allestire un'operazione per attaccare le unità navali italiane dislocate nella base di Taranto, perfezionando un piano di attacco notturno con aerosiluranti studiato già nel 1935 dall'ammiraglio Lumley Lyster, all'epoca della guerra d'Etiopia. Il piano era molto rischioso e contava molto sul fattore sorpresa, in quanto le portaerei da cui sarebbero decollati gli aerei per compiere la missione dovevano portarsi almeno a 130 miglia dalla costa italiana, con il rischio di essere scoperte dal nemico. Inoltre si doveva illuminare la rada ricorrendo al lancio di bengala, mentre gli aerosiluranti avrebbero dovuto volare a pelo d'acqua, per eludere le batterie contraeree e per evitare che i siluri affondassero nel fango del fondale basso. Pur con tutte queste precauzioni, se le navi italiane avessero steso le cortine fumogene l'azione sarebbe certamente fallita.
Il pomeriggio del 6 novembre 1940 l'operazione ebbe inizio: le navi da battaglia Malaya, Ramillies, Valiant e Warspite, la portaerei Illustrious, gli incrociatori Gloucester e York e 13 cacciatorpediniere salparono da Alessandria d'Egitto diretti verso Malta, nei cui pressi stazionava la portaerei Eagle. L'8 novembre, allarmato da queste manovre nel Mar Mediterraneo, il Comando supremo della Marina italiana inviò unità cacciatorpediniere, torpediniere e sommergibili di pattuglia nel canale di Sicilia, mentre nella base di Taranto fu fatto concentrare il grosso della forza navale italiana. Le navi britanniche raggiunsero Malta nella giornata del 10 novembre, ed il giorno seguente la portaerei Illustrious cominciò a dirigersi verso il punto prefissato per il lancio degli aerei verso Taranto. La portaerei Eagle non poté invece salpare a causa di un'avaria al motore: questo inconveniente dimezzò praticamente il numero di aerei disponibili, ma non costrinse a rinviare l'incursione.
Le ricognizioni degli aerei britannici su Taranto si protrassero fino alla sera dell'11 novembre, quando la Royal Navy apprese che nelle due rade del porto di Taranto si erano riunite le navi da battaglia Andrea Doria, Caio Duilio, Conte di Cavour, Giulio Cesare, Littorio e Vittorio Veneto, gli incrociatori pesanti Bolzano, Fiume, Gorizia, Pola, Trento, Trieste e Zara, i due incrociatori leggeri Luigi di Savoia Duca degli Abruzzi e Giuseppe Garibaldi e vari cacciatorpediniere. Per citare un'espressione dell'ammiraglio Andrew Cunningham: «Tutti i fagiani erano nel nido».
A difesa del porto erano previsti 87 palloni di sbarramento, ma le cattive condizioni climatiche dei giorni precedenti ne avevano strappati 60 e non si erano ancora potuti rimpiazzare a causa della mancanza di idrogeno. Le unità navali erano protette da reti parasiluri, ma degli 8.600 metri necessari per una difesa efficace, erano stati posati appena 4 200 metri. Queste reti erano comunque distese per soli 10 metri sotto il livello del mare, lasciando quindi uno spazio non protetto tra la rete stessa ed il fondale, mentre l'ammiraglio di squadra Inigo Campioni aveva chiesto che le reti parasiluri fossero sistemate ad una distanza dalle sue navi tale da poter salpare rapidamente, senza prima dover rimuovere le protezioni.
L'attacco alla base di Taranto era stato programmato per il 21 ottobre, in onore dell'anniversario della battaglia di Trafalgar, ma problemi tecnici a bordo dell'Illustrious posticiparono l'attacco all'11 novembre. Alle ore 20:30 dalla portaerei Illustrious cominciarono le operazioni di decollo della prima ondata di aerei diretti verso Taranto.
Giunti sull'obiettivo pochi minuti prima delle ore 23:00, furono accolti da un intenso fuoco di sbarramento. Due aerei cominciarono a lanciare i bengala sulla sponda orientale del Mar Grande per illuminare i profili dei bersagli, mentre 6 aerosiluranti Fairey Swordfish iniziarono a scendere a quota di siluramento. Un primo velivolo, che venne poi abbattuto, sganciò un siluro contro il Conte di Cavour, squarciandone la fiancata sinistra, altri due mirarono contro l’Andrea Doria, senza però colpirlo.
Contemporaneamente quattro aerosiluranti, armati con bombe, danneggiarono i cacciatorpediniere Libeccio e Pessagno, bombardarono i depositi di carburante e distrussero due idrovolanti. Alle 23:15 due aerosiluranti attaccarono contemporaneamente il Littorio, colpendolo sia a dritta che a sinistra, mentre l'ultimo Swordfish sganciò inutilmente un siluro contro il Vittorio Veneto.
Alle 23:20 gli aerei della prima ondata si ritirarono, ma alle 23:30 arrivarono gli aerei della seconda ondata. Nonostante il fuoco di sbarramento, un primo Swordfish sganciò un siluro contro il Caio Duilio colpendolo a dritta, mentre due aerosiluranti colpirono il Littorio. Un altro aereo mirò al Vittorio Veneto che anche questa volta fu risparmiato, mentre un secondo Swordfish venne abbattuto nel tentativo di attaccare il Gorizia.
Infine un ultimo attacco danneggiò seriamente l'incrociatore Trento. Gli ultimi aerei si ritirarono alle ore 0:30 del 12 novembre: l'attacco contro Taranto era terminato. In 90 minuti gli aerosiluranti della Royal Navy avevano prodotto danni ingenti, in quanto metà delle navi da battaglia italiana erano state messe fuori combattimento. Vi furono 58 morti, 32 dei quali sul Littorio, e 581 feriti, sei navi da guerra danneggiate (3 corazzate, il Cavour in maniera tanto grave che non riprese più servizio, 1 incrociatore e 2 cacciatorpediniere), e diversi danni alle installazioni terrestri.
L'esito dell'incursione dimostrò quanto fosse sbagliata la convinzione secondo cui gli aerosiluranti non avrebbero potuto colpire le navi all'interno delle basi, a causa dei bassi fondali, e segnò un punto di svolta nelle strategie della guerra sul mare affidando all'aviazione imbarcata, e quindi alle portaerei, un ruolo fondamentale nelle future battaglie. A Taranto si recò anche l'addetto militare presso l'ambasciata giapponese a Roma, con l'incarico di raccogliere maggiori informazioni sul raid.
Chi sembrò non aver appieno compreso la portata dell'evento fu Mussolini, infatti il 12 novembre Ciano annotò nel suo diario: "Giornata nera. Gli inglesi hanno attaccato la flotta alla fonda, a Taranto, e hanno colato a picco la Cavour e gravemente danneggiato la Littorio e la Duilio. Per molti mesi saranno fuori combattimento. Credevo di trovare il Duce abbattuto. Invece ha incassato bene il colpo e quasi sembra, in questi primi momenti, non averne valutata tutta la gravità".
Il Corriere della Sera annunciò in prima pagina: "Strage di apparecchi nemici durante un'incursione a Taranto". Ma poiché, evidentemente, la verità circolava, pochi giorni dopo, il 18 novembre, Mussolini affermò durante un discorso: "Effettivamente tre navi sono state colpite, ma nessuna di esse è stata affondata. È falso, dico falso, che due altre navi da guerra siano state affondate o colpite, o comunque anche leggermente danneggiate”.
L'incursione nello stretto di Otranto
Contemporaneamente all'attacco di Taranto, la sera dell'11 novembre, intorno alle ore 18.00, alcuni incrociatori e cacciatorpediniere inglesi si distaccarono dalla flotta principale per dirigersi verso il Canale d'Otranto, onde intercettare il traffico italiano verso l'Albania.
La formazione britannica, costituita dagli incrociatori leggeri Orion, Ajax, Sydney con la scorta dei cacciatorpediniere della Classe Tribal Nubian e Mohawk, intercettò un convoglio diretto a Valona, costituito dai piroscafi Antonio Locatelli, Premuda, Capo Vado e Catalani, scortati dalla vecchia torpediniera Fabrizi e dall'incrociatore ausiliario RAMB III.
L'azione ebbe luogo alle ore 01:05 del 12 novembre, quando la formazione inglese, dopo aver localizzato il convoglio italiano, affondò tutti i piroscafi nonostante la difesa offerta della torpediniera Fabrizi che, pur gravemente danneggiata, affrontò le navi nemiche. Mentre l'incrociatore ausiliario RAMB III, dopo un iniziale scambio d'artiglieria, si dileguò salvandosi nel porto di Brindisi. Nello scontro 36 marinai italiani persero la vita, 42 vennero feriti, mentre 140 marinai vennero salvati dalle torpediniere Curtatone e Solferino. Il comandante della torpediniera Fabrizi, tenente di vascello Giovanni Barbini, fu decorato con la medaglia d'oro al valor militare.
Conseguenze
Dopo l'attacco la flotta di base a Taranto venne spostata nel porto di Napoli. La messa fuori combattimento di tre della cinque corazzate in servizio fu un colpo durissimo per la Regia Marina e rappresentò un momento decisivo della guerra nel Mediterraneo poiché, stando a quanto riportava una relazione di Supermarina del 30 dicembre 1940, dopo Taranto "è venuto meno uno dei postulati strategici fondamentali su cui poteva fondarsi la nostra condotta delle operazioni: affrontare cioè con una superiorità di forza l'una o l'altra delle due frazioni della Mediterranean fleet”.
ENGLISH
The Battle of Taranto took place on the night of 11–12 November 1940 during the Second World War between British naval forces, under Admiral Andrew Cunningham, and Italian naval forces, under Admiral Inigo Campioni. The Royal Navy launched the first all-aircraft ship-to-ship naval attack in history, employing 21 Fairey Swordfish biplane torpedo bombers from the aircraft carrier HMS Illustrious in the Mediterranean Sea. The attack struck the battle fleet of the Regia Marina at anchor in the harbour of Taranto, using aerial torpedoes despite the shallowness of the water. The success of this attack augured the ascendancy of naval aviation over the big guns of battleships. According to Admiral Cunningham, "Taranto, and the night of 11–12 November 1940, should be remembered for ever as having shown once and for all that in the Fleet Air Arm the Navy has its most devastating weapon.”
Origins
Long before the First World War, the Italian Regia Marina's First Squadron was based at Taranto, a port-city on Italy's south-east coast. In that period, the British Royal Navy developed plans for countering the power of the Regia Marina. Blunting the power of any adversary in the Mediterranean Sea was an ongoing exercise. Plans for the capture of the port at Taranto were considered as early as the Italian invasion of Abyssinia in 1935.
In 1940–41, Italian Army operations in North Africa, based in Libya, required a supply line from Italy. The British Army's North African Campaign, based in Egypt, suffered from much greater supply difficulties. Supply convoys to Egypt had to either cross the Mediterranean via Gibraltar and Malta near the coast of Sicily, or steam around the Cape of Good Hope, up the east coast of Africa, and then through the Suez Canal to reach Alexandria. The latter was a very long and slow route, and the Italian fleet was in an excellent position to interdict British supplies and reinforcements using the direct route through the Mediterranean.
Following the concept of a fleet in being, the Italians usually kept their warships in harbour and were unwilling to seek battle with the Royal Navy on their own, also because any ship lost larger than a destroyer could not be replaced. The Italian fleet at Taranto was powerful: six battleships (of which one was not yet battleworthy, Andrea Doria having her crew still in training after her reconstruction), seven heavy cruisers, two light cruisers and eight destroyers. This made the threat of a sortie against British shipping a serious problem.
During the Munich Crisis of 1938, Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, the commander of the British Mediterranean Fleet, was concerned about the survival of the aircraft carrier HMS Glorious in the face of Italian opposition in the Mediterranean, and ordered his staff to re-examine all plans for attacking Taranto. He was advised by Lumley Lyster, the captain of Glorious, that his Fairey Swordfish biplane torpedo bombers were capable of a night attack. Indeed, the Fleet Air Arm was then the only naval aviation arm with such a capability. Pound took Lyster's advice and ordered training to begin. Security was kept so tight there were no written records. Just a month before the war began, Pound advised his replacement, Admiral Andrew Cunningham, to consider the possibility. This came to be known as Operation Judgment.
The fall of France and the consequent loss of the French fleet in the Mediterranean (even before Operation Catapult) made redress essential. The older carrier, HMS Eagle, on Cunningham's strength, was ideal, possessing a very experienced air group composed entirely of the obsolescent Swordfish aircraft. Three Sea Gladiator fighters were added for the operation. Firm plans were drawn up after the Italian Army halted at Sidi Barrani, which freed up the British Mediterranean Fleet.
Operation Judgment was just a small part of the overarching Operation MB8. It was originally scheduled to take place on 21 October 1940, Trafalgar Day, but a fire in an auxiliary fuel tank of one Swordfish led to a delay. 60 imp gal (270 L) auxiliary tanks were fitted in the observer's position on torpedo bombers - the observer taking the air gunner's position - to extend the operating range of the aircraft enough to reach Taranto.) This minor fire spread into something more serious that destroyed two Swordfish. Eagle then suffered a breakdown in her fuel system, so she was eliminated.
When the brand-new carrier HMS Illustrious, based at Alexandria, became available in the Mediterranean, she took on board five Swordfish from Eagle and launched the strike alone.
The complete naval task force—commanded by now-Rear Admiral Lyster, who had originated the plan of attack on Taranto—consisted of Illustrious, the heavy cruisers HMS Berwick and York, the light cruisers HMS Gloucester and Glasgow, and the destroyers HMS Hyperion, Ilex, Hasty and Havelock. The 24 attack Swordfish came from 813, 815, 819, and 824 Naval Air Squadrons. The small number of attacking warplanes raised concern that Judgment would only alert and enrage the Italian Navy without achieving any significant results. Illustrious also had Fairey Fulmar fighters of 806 Naval Air Squadron aboard to provide air cover for the task force, with radar and fighter control systems.
Half of the Swordfish were armed with torpedoes as the primary strike aircraft, with the other half carrying aerial bombs and flares to carry out diversions. These torpedoes were fitted with Duplex magnetic/contact exploders, which were extremely sensitive to rough seas, as the attacks on the German battleship Bismarck later showed. There were also worries the torpedoes would bottom out in the harbour after being dropped. The loss rate for the bombers was expected to be fifty percent.
Several reconnaissance flights by Martin Marylands of the RAF's No. 431 General Reconnaissance Flight flying from Malta confirmed the location of the Italian fleet. These flights produced photos on which the intelligence officer of Illustrious spotted previously unexpected barrage balloons; the attack plan was changed accordingly. To make sure the Italian warships had not sortied, the British also sent over a Short Sunderland flying boat on the night of 11 November, just as the carrier task force was forming up off the Greek island of Cephalonia, about 170 nmi (310 km; 200 mi) from Taranto harbour. This reconnaissance flight alerted the Italian forces in southern Italy, but since they were without any radars, they could do little but wait for whatever came along. The Regia Marina could conceivably have gone to sea in search of any British naval force, but this was distinctly against the naval philosophy of the Italians between January 1940 and September 1943.
The complexity of Operation MB8, with its various forces and convoys, succeeded in deceiving the Italians into thinking only normal convoying was under way. This contributed to the success of Judgment.
The base of Taranto was defended by 101 anti-aircraft guns and 193 machine-guns, and was usually protected against low-flying aircraft by barrage balloons, of which only 27 were in place on 11 November, as strong winds on 6 November had blown away 60 balloons. Capital ships were also supposed to be protected by anti-torpedo nets, but 12,800 m (42,000 ft) of netting was required for full protection, and only one-third of that was rigged before the attack due to a scheduled gunnery exercise. Moreover, these nets did not reach the bottom of the harbour, allowing the British torpedoes to clear them by about 60 cm (24 in).
Attack
The first wave of 12 aircraft, led by Lieutenant Commander K Williamson RN of 815 Squadron, left Illustrious just before 21:00 hours on 11 November 1940, followed by a second wave of nine about 90 minutes later. Of the second wave, one aircraft turned back with a problem with its auxiliary fuel tank, and one launched 20 minutes late, after requiring emergency repairs to damage following a minor taxiing accident, so only eight made it to the target.
The first wave, which consisted of six Swordfish armed with torpedoes, two with flares and four 250 lb (110 kg) bombs, and four with six bombs, was split into two sections when three of the bombers and one torpedo bomber strayed from the main force while flying through thin clouds. The smaller group continued to Taranto independently. The main group approached the harbour at Mar Grande at 22:58. Sixteen flares were dropped east of the harbour, then the flare dropper and another aircraft made a dive bombing attack to set fire to oil tanks. The next three aircraft, led by Lieutenant Commander K Williamson RN of 815 Squadron, attacked over San Pietro Island, and struck the battleship Conte di Cavour with a torpedo that blasted a 27 ft (8.2 m) hole in her side below her waterline. Williamson's plane was immediately shot down by the Italian battleship's anti-aircraft guns. The two remaining aircraft in this sub-flight continued, dodging barrage balloons and receiving heavy anti-aircraft fire from the Italian warships and shore batteries, to press home an unsuccessful attack on the battleship Andrea Doria. The next sub-flight of three attacked from a more northerly direction, attacking the battleship Littorio, hitting it with two torpedoes and launching one torpedo at the flagship, the battleship Vittorio Veneto, which missed. The bomber force, led by Captain O. Patch RM, attacked next. They found the targets difficult to identify, but attacked and hit two cruisers moored at Mar Piccolo hitting both with a single bomb each from 1,500 ft (460 m), followed by another aircraft which straddled four destroyers.
The second wave of eight aircraft - nine were lined up on deck, but number 8 and 9 collided while preparing to launch, one took off but had to abort when an auxiliary fuel tank fell off in flight; meanwhile, the other was repaired and launched late - led by Lieutenant Commander J. W. Hale of 819 Squadron, was now approaching from a northerly direction towards the Mar Grande harbour, with two of the four bombers also carrying flares, the remaining five carrying torpedoes. Flares were dropped shortly before midnight. Two aircraft aimed their torpedoes at Littorio, one of which hit. One aircraft, despite having been hit twice by anti-aircraft fire, aimed a torpedo at Vittorio Veneto but the torpedo missed. Another aircraft hit the battleship Caio Duilio with a torpedo, blowing a large hole in her hull and flooding both of her forward magazines. The aircraft flown by Lieutenant G. W. L. A. Bayly RN was shot down by antiaircraft fire from the heavy cruiser Gorizia following the successful attack on Littorio, the only aircraft lost from the second wave. The final aircraft to arrive on the scene 15 minutes behind the others made an unsuccessful dive bombing attack on one of the Italian cruisers despite heavy anti-aircraft fire, then safely returned to Illustrious, landing at 02:39.
Of the two aircraft shot down, the two crew members of the first were taken prisoner. The other two were killed.
The Italian battleships suffered significant damage:
Conte di Cavour had a 12 m × 8 m (39 ft × 26 ft) hole in the hull, and permission to ground her was withheld until it was too late, so her keel touched the bottom at a deeper depth than intended. 27 of the ship's crew were killed and over 100 more wounded. In the end, only her superstructure and main armament remained above water. She was subsequently raised, partially repaired and transferred to Trieste for further repairs and upgrades, but changed situation put these works in low priority. She was still undergoing repairs when Italy surrendered, so she never returned to full service;
Caio Duilio had only a slightly smaller hole (11 m × 7 m (36 ft × 23 ft)) and was saved by running her aground;
Littorio had considerable flooding caused by three torpedo hits. Despite underwater protection (the 'Pugliese' system, standard in all Italian battleships), the damage was extensive, although actual damage to the ship's structures was relatively limited (the machinery was intact). Casualties were 32 crewmen killed and many wounded. She was holed in three places, once on the port side (7 m × 1.5 m (23 ft 0 in × 4 ft 11 in)), and twice on the starboard side (15 m × 10 m (49 ft × 33 ft) and 12 m × 9 m (39 ft × 30 ft)). She too was saved by running her aground. Despite this, in the morning, the ship's bows were totally submerged.
Italian defences fired 13,489 shells from the land batteries, while several thousand were fired from the ships. The anti-aircraft barrage was formidable, having 101 guns and 193 machine-guns. There were also 87 balloons, but strong winds caused the loss of 60 of them. Only 4.2 km (2.3 nmi; 2.6 mi) of anti-torpedo nets were actually fielded around the ships, up to 10 m (33 ft) in depth, while the need was for 12.8 km (6.9 nmi; 8.0 mi). There were also 13 aerophonic stations and 22 searchlights (the ships had two searchlights each). Denis Boyd, Commanding Officer HMS Illustrious, stated in his after-action report, "It is notable that the enemy did not use the searchlights at all during either of the attacks."
Littorio was repaired with all available resources and was fully operational again within four months, while restoration of the older battleships proceeded at a much slower pace (repairs took seven months for Caio Duilio, and the repairs for Conte di Cavour were never completed). In all, the Swordfish attack was made with just 20 aircraft. Two Italian aircraft were destroyed on the ground by the bombing, and two unexploded bombs hit the cruiser Trento and the destroyer Libeccio. Near misses damaged the destroyer Pessagno.
Meanwhile, X-Force cruisers attacked an Italian convoy (Battle of the Strait of Otranto (1940)). This force had three cruisers (HMS Ajax, Orion and HMAS Sydney) and two Tribal-class destroyers (HMS Nubian and Mohawk). Just past midnight, they met and destroyed four Italian merchantmen (Capo Vado, Catalani, Locatelli and Premuda), damaging the torpedo-boat Fabrizi, while the heavily out-gunned auxiliary cruiser Ramb III fled.
Cunningham and Lyster wanted to strike Taranto again the next night with Swordfish (six torpedo-bombers, seven bombers, and two flare-dispensers) – one wag in the pilots' room remarked, "They only asked the Light Brigade to do it once!" – but bad weather prevented the action.
Aftermath
The Italian fleet lost half of its capital ships in one night; the next day, the Regia Marina transferred its undamaged ships from Taranto to Naples to protect them from similar attacks, until the defences at Taranto (mainly the anti-torpedo nets) were brought up to adequate levels to protect them from further attacks of the same kind (which happened between March and May 1941). Repairs to Littorio took about four months, to Caio Duilio seven months; Conte di Cavour required extensive salvage work and her repairs were incomplete when Italy surrendered in 1943. Cunningham wrote after the attack: "The Taranto show has freed up our hands considerably & I hope now to shake these damned Itiys up a bit. I don't think their remaining three battleships will face us and if they do I'm quite prepared to take them on with only two." Indeed, the balance of power had swung to the British Mediterranean Fleet which now enjoyed more operational freedom: when previously forced to operate as one unit to match Italian capital ships, they could now split into two battlegroups; each built around one aircraft carrier and two battleships.
Nevertheless, Cunningham's estimate that Italians would be unwilling to risk their remaining heavy units was quickly proven wrong. Only five days after Taranto, Campioni sortied with two battleships, six cruisers and 14 destroyers to successfully disrupt a mission to deliver aircraft to Malta. The follow-up to this operation led to the Battle of Cape Spartivento on 27 November 1940. Two of the three damaged battleships were repaired by mid-1941 and control of the Mediterranean continued to swing back and forth until the Italian armistice in 1943.
The attack on Taranto was avenged a year later by the Italian navy in its Raid on Alexandria, when the Mediterranean fleet of the Royal Navy was attacked using midget submarines, severely damaging HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Valiant.
However, measured against its primary task of disrupting Axis convoys to Africa, the Taranto attack had very little effect. In fact, Italian shipping to Libya increased between the months of October 1940 – January 1941 to an average of 49,435 tons per month, up from the 37,204-ton average of the previous four months. Moreover, rather than change the balance of power in the central Mediterranean, British naval authorities had "failed to deliver the true knockout blow that would have changed the context within which the rest of the war in the Mediterranean was fought."
Aerial torpedo experts in all modern navies had previously thought that torpedo attacks against ships must be in water at least 75 ft (23 m) deep. Taranto harbour had a depth of only about 39 ft (12 m); but the Royal Navy had developed a new method of preventing torpedoes from diving too deep. A drum was attached beneath the nose of the aircraft, from which a roll of wire led to the nose of the torpedo. As it dropped, the tension from the wire pulled up the nose of the torpedo, producing a belly-flop rather than a nose dive.
Influence on Pearl Harbor
It is likely the Imperial Japanese Navy's staff carefully studied the Taranto raid during planning for the attack on Pearl Harbor, as both attacks faced similar issues attacking a shallow harbour. Japanese Lieutenant Commander Takeshi Naito, the assistant naval attaché to Berlin, flew to Taranto to investigate the attack firsthand. Naito subsequently had a lengthy conversation with Commander Mitsuo Fuchida about his observations in October 1941. Fuchida led the Japanese attack on 7 December 1941. More significant, perhaps, was a Japanese military mission to Italy in May 1941. A group of IJN officers visited Taranto and had lengthy discussions with their Italian Navy opposite numbers. However, the Japanese had been working on shallow-water solutions since early 1939, with various shallow ports as the notional targets, including Manila, Singapore, Vladivostok, and Pearl Harbor. In the early 1930s, as their Type 91 aerial torpedo entered service, the Japanese used a breakaway wooden nose to soften its impact with the water. As early as 1936, they perfected breakaway wooden fins for added aerial stability.
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was a considerably larger operation than Taranto. All six Imperial Japanese fleet carriers, each one equipped with an air wing having over twice the number of planes of any British carrier, took part. It resulted in far more devastation: seven American battleships were sunk or disabled, and several other warships were destroyed or damaged. The U.S. Navy thereafter designed its fleet operations in the Pacific Ocean around its carriers instead of its battleships as capital ships. Battleships were found to be less useful in the expanses of the Pacific than in the confines of the Mediterranean; the older ships were too slow to escort the carriers, and were chiefly used as fire support for amphibious operations.
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L'ammiraglio CAMPIONI
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